










    The main purpose of the dissertation is to investigates whether the Taiwan 
Diagnosis Related Group-based prospective reimbursement system (Tw-DRG) 
works in Taiwan. This study consists of two independent chapters. Chapter 1 
examines whether the Tw-DRG scheme improved hospital performance in a private 
not-for-profit hospital in Taiwan. This study compares data from the case hospital 
concerning monthly financial data and related information for 26 departments from 
2009 (before the implementation of the system, i.e., the pre-Tw-DRG period) with 
that from 2010 following the implementation of the system (the Tw-DRG period). 
This study employs a pre- and post-design with a comparison group study approach. 
The intervention group consists of departments where more than one case is 
reimbursed under the Tw-DRG policy and are classified as the Tw-DRG group; and 
the comparison group consists of departments that do not have any cases reimbursed 
under the policy and are classified as the non-Tw-DRG group. Departmental 
operating profitability and efficiency in the case hospital are used to measure 
hospital performance over the two aforementioned periods. The results find that in 
contrast to the non-Tw-DRG group, the performance of the Tw-DRG group in the 
case hospital deteriorated after the introduction of the Tw-DRG program. This study 
aims to contribute to a better understanding of the economic roles of the Tw-DRG 
policy. Documenting the relationship between the regulatory intervention and 
hospital performance has policy implications for health policy officials and 
healthcare organizations. The findings of this study might also be valuable for health 
policy officials and healthcare organizations in other countries who are considering 
the implementation of prospective reimbursement systems. 
    In Chapter 2, this study examines the effects of a Physician fee (PF) program 
on a hospital’s performance before and after the implementation of the Tw-DRG 
scheme. I use a private not-for-profit hospital in Taiwan to investigate the research 
question. The data sample contains 624 monthly observations of the 26 departments 
in the case hospital for the period 2009-2010. Of the 26 departments, 18 have 
implemented the Tw-DRG reimbursement system and are classified as the Tw-DRG 
group; and the other 8 departments are classified as the non-Tw-DRG group. Since 
the introduction of the TW-DRG system, the physicians in both groups have been 
paid under the PF program. The pay-performance sensitivity measure is used to 
examine the relationship between hospital performance and physicians’ 
compensation before and after the implementation of the Tw-DRG system. The 
departments are classified according to their degree of Tw-DRG involvement, and 
the effects of the PF program on the hospital’s performance are assessed. Overall, 
the results show that the case hospital’s performance deteriorated after the 
implementation of the Tw-DRG system. The results imply that conflicts arise 
between departments that are under the Tw-DRG reimbursement scheme and those 
that have implemented the PF program. This study also provides evidence that 
physicians’ behavior affects their clinical performance, especially under a strict cost 
containment payment policy. Hence, health service researchers and healthcare 
providers should reexamine incentive mechanisms for physicians that work under 
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